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Abstract
Scientific discourse refers to triads as conceptual structures whose purpose is to em-
phasize the connection between concepts included in the description of a certain 
phenomenon. The famous Popper’s triad is comprised of the world of physical objects 
and processes (World 1), the world of mental objects, i.e. subjective human experience 
(World 2) and the world of objective knowledge (World 3), which can be thought of as 
all the products of thought – the world of information, knowledge, scientific theories, 
literature, etc. During the past half-century, Information and Communication Tech-
nology (ICT) and new media began to change our reality on all three levels. Using a 
comparative analysis, this paper will examine the impact ICT and new media have on 
the Popper’s World 1, 2 and 3. 
As it will be shown, the modern age offers a new conceptual triad the aim of which 
is not to stand against the Popper’s triad but to introduce new integral elements that 
intersect and interact with it. In this new triad the world of physical objects is being 
replaced by the world of virtual reality (i.e. the Virtual World), the world of mental 
objects is replaced by transmental objects (i.e. the Transmental World) and the world 
of objective knowledge is being replaced by the world of digitized data/information/
knowledge in the context of developing AI (i.e. the Digital World). These new architec-
tonic elements build new conceptual structure the aim of which is to define, describe 
and represent new interrelated concepts essential for better understanding of today’s 
totality of reality. They form new ontology of the world which describes reality as in-
separable from the concepts of information and technology.
Keywords: Popper’s triad, ICT, totality of reality, virtual realities, human-technology in-
teraction, artificial intelligence
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Izvleček
Znanstveni diskurz obravnava triade kot pojmovne strukture, katerih namen je, da po-
udarijo povezavo med pojmi, s katerimi je opisan določen pojav. Znamenita Popperje-
va triada je sestavljena iz sveta fizičnih objektov in procesov (Svet 1), sveta mentalnih 
objektov (Svet 2) in sveta objektivnega znanja (Svet 3), pod katerim lahko razumemo 
vse produkte mišljenja – svet informacij, znanja, znanstvenih teorij, literature itd. V 
zadnji polovici stoletja so informacijska in komunikacijska tehnologija (IKT) in novi 
mediji spremenili vse tri ravni naše realnosti. Članek analizira vpliv IKT ter novih me-
dijev na Popperjev svet 1, 2 in 3 z uporabo metode primerjalne analize.
Kot prikazuje članek, moderna doba prinaša novo pojmovno triado, ki ne nasprotuje 
Popperjevi triadi, pač uvaja nove integralne elemente. Ti elementi se z njo križajo ter so 
z njo v interakciji. V tej novi triadi je svet fizičnih objektov zamenjan z virtualno realno-
stjo (tj. virtualni svet), svet mentalnih objektov je zamenjan s trans mentalnimi objekti 
(tj. trans mentalni svet), svet objektivnega znanja pa je zamenjan s svetom digitalizi-
ranih podatkov/informacij/znanja v kontekstu umetne inteligence (tj. digitalni svet).
Ti novi arhitektonski elementi gradijo novo pojmovno strukturo, ki cilja na definicijo, 
opis in predstavitev novih med seboj povezanih pojmov, ki so bistveni za boljše ra-
zumevanje sedanje totalne realnosti. Predstavljajo novo ontologijo sveta, ki opisuje 
realnost, ki je ne moremo ločiti od pojmov informacije in tehnologije.
Ključne besede: Popperjeva triada, informacijsko-komunikacijska tehnologija, totalna 
realnost, virtualna realnost, interakcija človek-računalnik, umetna inteligenca
1 Describing reality: Popper’s three worlds
The totality of reality has long been a question that has interested many philoso-
phers. Can reality, which surrounds us and which we belong to, be described by 
some inner insight? What is it ultimately made of? Is there a reality independent 
of our mental states and language? These and other questions hide the outlines of 
something we represent to ourselves using the outer and inner worlds. On the one 
hand, there is the outside world; the reality itself as an objective space, and on the 
other, there is the mind with our consciousness, the self, our language and other 
meaningful components of our subjective inner space. Thus, philosophers di-
vided themselves into two camps: realists and anti-realists. Realists who believe 
that the reality is objective and independent of our beliefs, linguistic practices, 
conceptual schemes, etc. and that our goal is to discover it. And anti-realists who 
believe that there is a reality but that is it not independent of us; it is something 
we construct, not discover. However, if we ask ourselves what is reality really 
made of, one answer in particular stands out: the attempt of Austrian philosopher 
Karl Popper (Popper, 1978) to present the reality through its own existential triad 
constructed of three worlds.
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Karl R. Popper (Popper, 1978) formed his own ontology of the world, which con-
sists of three parts/worlds (Figure 1):
 – World 1: physical objects and processes
 – World 2: consciousness or psychical states
 – World 3: products of the human mind (the intellectual contents of books, docu-
ments, scientific theories, etc.) 
In this triad, the Physical (material) World is interpreted as the physical real-
ity studied by natural sciences. In the Physical World, there are real tables and 
chairs, the sun and stars, stones, flowers, butterflies, space and time, molecules 
and atoms, electrons and photons. The Mental World includes the social con-
science. In the Mental World, there are real “things” and “phenomena”. For ex-
ample, there are happiness and pain, smell and colour, love and understanding, 
impression and images (of stars, tables, chairs, etc.). In addition, the Popper’s 
World 3 includes the products of human mind in the form of knowledge or infor-
mation, such as the intellectual contents of books, documents, scientific theories, 
etc.
Physical World (1) Mental World (2)
World (3) of  
information/knowledge
Figure 1: Karl R. Popper Triad of the World
It is necessary to understand that these three worlds are not separate realities, 
they interact and intersect. Thus, individual mentality, as a subjective and ex-
tended point of view, is based on the brain which is a physical, material entity. 
On the other hand, physicists discuss a possibility that mentality influences the 
physical world by changing and shaping it (Herbert, 1987), while our knowledge 
of the physical world and existence depends to a great extent on the connec-
tion and interaction between the subjective mental world and objective physical 
world. That is, our view of reality and its existence is determined by and relative 
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to the existence of our consciousness, which is a part of our reality (Yehezkel, 
2014).
2 Popper’s three worlds and library and information science (LIS)
The Popper’s triad has already been mentioned and discussed in some of the 
papers and articles in the field of library and information science where the Three 
Worlds have been used to describe the concept of information, as well as other 
concepts and processes concerning library and information science.
First we have Cornelius who, while rethinking the construction of information, 
refers to Bates (2010) and her attempt to define the information both as a term and 
as a concept while calling upon the works of Claude Shannon, Norbert Wiener 
and Karl Popper. He also refers to Brookes’ claim (1980) about information inputs 
changing the knowledge structure of a recipient’s mind. Eventually, Cornelius 
proposes a normative theory of information which doesn’t identify information 
as necessarily a real thing and a final object in the world or a mind-independent 
objective fact, i.e. he defines information as the logic that determines what type 
of statement would constitute an answer to the enquiry (Cornelius, 2014, p. 202).
There is also an attempt of Robinson (2015a, 2015b) to describe the influence of 
new technologies on information itself and on how we experience it. The technol-
ogy of virtual and augmented reality hasn’t only created new spaces but it has 
also opened up a space for the emergence of a new type of digital and virtual ob-
jects amongst which quite different type of information appears – information in 
the form of immersive, multisensory and pervasive document. Technologies like 
multisensory interfaces and mobile, pervasive, interactive and participatory com-
puting technologies do not only support the emergence of these new documents 
but they also provide a context for the emergence of a new type of interaction 
with digital information, a new type of information behaviour and information 
literacy. As unreal becomes more real and “readers” get more and more immersed 
in this striking new type of document (Robinson, 2015a, p. 120) information experi-
ence changes dramatically.
In her explanation of the meaning of “information” Ma (2012) combines the 
three models, i.e. the Shannon-Weaver model, the Brookes’ interpretation of the 
Popper’s World 3 and the Data-Information-Knowledge-Wisdom model. It is par-
ticularly interesting how she connects the Popper’s World 2 and 3 through the 
concept of information that, embodied in the physical form, can go through a 
change and thus modify knowledge structures in human mind. This means that 
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information, in a way, becomes a quantitative entity or event that has caused ef-
fects upon human beings (Ma, 2012, p. 723).
And last there is Bawden (2002) who argues the applicability, validity and useful-
ness of the Popper’s Three Worlds in order to better describe and understand the 
concept of the health-care information and knowledge. World 1 is represented by 
health-care information products, World 2 by the tacit dimension of the health-
care knowledge mostly referred to as personal knowledge which is the result of a 
reflective practice, and World 3 is represented by the objective health-care knowl-
edge base distinct from any physical manifestations. All the three worlds interact, 
while World 2 remains central to the interactions.
These examples prove that the idea of technological development and its influ-
ence on our totality of reality goes beyond the creation of virtual reality and rise 
of artificial intelligence and that it can be used to describe new phenomena and 
processes concerning information itself as a foundation and building block of the 
modern information society.
3 The rise of ICT and new media
The rise of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and global media 
culture challenges and often surpasses traditional forms of human existence and 
socialization (Youth and information and communication technologies, 2003). 
Technology is both a tool and a process through which humans and machines 
interact and, therefore, create culture. New manufacturing, automation, disrup-
tive, networking and smart technologies do not only blur the conceptual nodes 
of cybercultural architecture (Matrix, 2006, p. 28), they support technological 
dependence and the politics of constant upgrading, permanent instability and 
boundary implosion.
As men in the past used technica, meaning various tools and electro-mechanical 
techniques, to alter the nature and create and adjust their physical reality, today 
we use ICT and new digital media to create the virtual reality as an alternative 
reality with all its constituent elements, to alter our mental states and transform 
our experience and the perception of physical reality and existence, to code our 
human connections generating ever connected ecosystems and to create new 
cultural artefacts and form new knowledge in the context of connective media 
and techno culture. If we were to follow a more utopian approach, then we could 
perceive ICT and digital media as more of a “revolutionary force that can funda-
mentally transform societies and individual lives” (Hamelink, 1997, p. 23). How-
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ever, as “realists”, we can fairly say that our physical world is rapidly changing 
under the influence of technica and technology. And not only changing via their 
influence but also via their presence – they are extending all over the physical 
world, including our bodies and brains and thus, even our minds. If we ask the 
question about the life source, the essence of the technology and media that we 
use, the answer is quite evident – it is bitized, i.e., digitized data and information. 
Because of that, from now on everything will have its own (digital) boundaries. 
The analogue endlessness is being replaced by the digital boundedness. Bitized 
data, information and knowledge stand as digital products of disembodied hu-
man mind who are prone to automatization, mechanical manipulation and in-
terpretation which changes not only their own form but also their nature and 
meaning1. However, as ICT and digital media change and intervene with the Pop-
per’s worlds, making them more adjustable and understandable to machines, 
humans may encounter difficulties in distinguishing between the truth and the 
representation of the truth, in determining which images and which experience 
to believe as true and in determining which parts of our identity are really us. 
When discussing the issue of identity and reality, the assumption must be made 
that ICT and its informational culture often presume the values of western cul-
ture, which cannot be directly applied to other cultures and traditions (Youth 
and information and communication technologies, 2003). Still, more often do all 
of us, as members of digital society and cyber culture, transform ourselves into 
organisms represented in the virtual environment by receiving, processing and 
transmitting information.
Furthermore, the digitization and expansion of communication are changing the 
nature of our society and improving many of its aspects (Hamelink, 1997). We are 
now faced with principles of convergence and multifunctionality (i.e. there are 
new modes of information handling and multifunctional applications of informa-
tion and technology), the rise of machine intelligence (the occurrence of smart 
technologies and robotics) and ubiquity (digital technologies become pervasive).
Not only do ICT and digital technology influence human society but there is also 
a mutual constitution of technology and society as a whole (Cockburn, 1983). 
It is not only a question of engagement between the technology and the physi-
cal world or between the technology and the human mind and identity but also 
a question of engagement between the technology and intellectual products of 
 1 Digital data/information/knowledge do not just stand as completely independent “new” World 
3, but they interact with the World 1 and 2 as digital building blocks of cyber and virtual worlds 
and as digital inputs that change, determine and expand our cyber minds and consciousness 
adapting them to new forms of existence.
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the human mind. Current technological developments in digital technology and 
computing imbricate our everyday existence (Gere, 2008) and determine the po-
sitioning of the Three Worlds.
3.1 ICT’s Impact on World 1 of Popper’s Triad
If we consider ICT and digital media and World 1, or the Physical World, the first 
thing that probably comes to mind, apart from ICT and media infrastructure which 
exists in the physical world, is virtual worlds and virtual realities. The virtual re-
ality, or virtual environment or synthetic environment, refers to technologically 
created artificial and/or imaginary worlds that would be either indistinguishable 
from the real world as its simulation (e.g. Second Life) or would serve as a paral-
lel imaginary existence with completely different type of (virtual) existence and 
experience (e.g. World of Warcraft). The term “virtual” itself is often used with 
various meanings, usually referring to something that is “not real”, artificial or 
simulated. If we go a few decades back, the Oxford Dictionary from 1985 defines 
“virtual” as “being in fact, acting as, what is described, but not accepted openly 
or in name as such” (Oxford advanced learner’s dictionary of current English, 
1985). By that definition, virtual reality is in fact a reality. The next question thus 
emerges: how can we define what reality is? That is, of course, a philosophical 
question much larger than the scope of this paper, but we can propose a kind of 
an answer. Something can be considered real if it has measurable consequences. 
In that sense, if a person spends time in a virtual world and whatever happens 
there has consequences for that person, then that virtual world is real, at least to 
that person. Now that we have mentioned time, in the physical world there is no 
space without time, they are interconnected. The same can be said for the virtual 
world. If the time stops, the virtual world stops existing. Why is this important? If 
we consider the virtual space of a single-player computer game, for example, that 
virtual space exists while the player is playing, and while we can argue that this 
virtual space is real to the player, it does not exist independently of that player. 
On the other hand, in the case of the virtual world of a Massively Multiplayer 
Online Role-Playing Game (MMORPG), we have a time flow that is independent 
of the player. The time in the game flows whether an individual player is playing 
or not. Here, we can say that the virtual world exists independently of the player, 
and we thus have a virtual reality that really exists, just not in a physical form.
Now, let’s return to the forms of virtual reality we have today. Almost every new 
technology starts by imitating an old one before it develops its own niche. Printed 
books began by imitating handwritten ones; the first automobiles imitated a car-
riage and so on. We might say that virtual reality, as a new technology, does not 
have an old one to imitate. Instead of imitating an old technology, it began by 
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imitating the physical reality. That created a large amount of hype around virtual 
reality and gave many people unrealistic expectations of what virtual reality tech-
nologies could really do. As people slowly realized that virtual reality was not yet 
as sophisticated as they had been lead to believe, their interest declined. Maybe, 
the best example of this is the Second Life, a virtual world with a sole purpose of 
existing as a virtual world. In the ten years since its creation, it has never gained a 
large amount of popularity. We might say that it merely simulates the reality with 
little added value. MMORPGs are much more popular, and the most popular of all 
is World of Warcraft (WoW). All of them gained their popularity not by simulating 
physical reality but by being different from it. And some of those worlds are true 
simulacrums occurring as pure eternalisations of human mind. Socializing and 
gaming elements are backed up by the ability to do things that are difficult or 
impossible in the physical world. Moreover, Constance Steinkuehler argues that 
MMOGs can be seen as a third place, as defined by Rey Oldenburg (Steinkuehler, 
2005). Oldenburg defines a third place as a place that is different from the home 
or workplace; it is a sort of community-building place vital for the whole com-
munity as well as individuals in it (Oldenburg, 1999). Steinkuehler argues that 
MMOGs satisfy all the seven criteria of a third place and they, in fact, function as 
such, especially for young people.
However, this phenomenon does not stop at online games. The virtual worlds of 
social media add yet another dimension. Today social media are deeply inter-
twined with the physical reality, so people often do not perceive them as virtual 
worlds. Nevertheless, they are virtual, and they often create “additional” reali-
ties. Maybe, the best proof of this is its use in identity creation. It is well-known 
that people use anonymous virtual environments to present themselves as being 
something they cannot be in the physical world (Turkle, 1995), and something 
similar happens in anonymous virtual environments like Facebook. On Facebook, 
people tend to construct socially desirable identities that are often different from 
their offline identities (Zhao, Grasmuck & Martin, 2008), which suggests that the 
virtual world of Facebook functions like a different reality, one that is often deeply 
connected to the offline reality but still different from it. 20 years ago, Mark Poster 
said the following:
… there is every reason to think that virtual reality technologies will develop 
rapidly and will eventually enable participation through the Internet. Con-
nected to one’s home computer, one will experience an audiovisual “world” 
generated from a node somewhere in the Internet, and this will include other 
participants in the same way that today, one can communicate with others on 
bulletin boards in videotext. If such experiences become commonplace, just 
as viewing television is today, then surely reality will have been multiplied 
(Poster, 1995).
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Today, we see that virtual realities have evolved a little differently than it was 
predicted. They do not always appear as separate simulated worlds but often as 
additional realities that are so close to us that we do not always perceive them 
as different but as parts of one large multiple reality. They can never be seen as 
completely inseparable for there is a constant permeation between them through 
the transfer of experiences, sensations, behaviour and thoughts. In contrast to 
the physical reality the virtual reality has a different degree of reproduction fidel-
ity, presence and interactivity (Milgram, Takemura, Utsumi & Kishino, 1994), but 
through feeling of immersion, interactivity, presence and information intensity 
which can lead to involvement, different behavioural modes and emotional re-
actions; it can change our emotional state and behaviour providing us with true 
physical and metaphysical experience.
Also, as digital age brought new kinds of worlds, virtual worlds and cyber worlds, 
people nowadays become true digital citizens. This metaphysical citizenship is 
based on free cosmopolitan communication and the exchange of information 
where each piece of information, digital and bitized is prone to mining, automati-
zation, commercialization and manipulation. The automatization of our physical 
and virtual world reflects in both transmitting the information and interpreting 
it, while commercialization slowly devours once free and open web space. Thus, 
possibly commercially dependent, a medium becomes the interpreter, which 
Capurro (2014) sees as a huge problem.
So, even now we could agree with Heim (1998) who argues that we should not 
become too idealistic and enthusiastic about computer generated realities, i.e. 
we should become and stay virtual realists – grounded in our primary reality, but 
also sensible artists who can balance computers, technology and digital media 
with their human spirit. But still, as these engineered realities of virtual worlds 
and social media slowly become our primary spaces of work and leisure, spaces 
in which we immerse daily, where we feel present, spaces that we feel as coher-
ent environments in which we perform activities and interact and communicate 
(Gutiérrez, Vexo & Thalmann, 2008, p. 3) and spaces we are able to genuinely ex-
perience as a mimetic world of natural, physical traits (Capurro, Eldred & Nagel, 
2013, p. 117), we cannot but agree that they’re literally becoming a new dimension 
for living our lives, a new World 1.
3.2 ICT’s Impact on World 2 of Popper’s Triad
The biotechnological appropriation of the human changes and redefines the con-
cept of its identity, its body and its conscience (mind and mental states). The self 
becomes disembodied and then symbolically represented in the virtual world, 
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and life gradually takes a subjective turn. It turns away from the “life as” (life 
lived as a dutiful spouse, parent, strong leader, etc.) to the “subjective life” (life 
lived in deep connection with the unique experiences of our self-in-relation), 
which includes states of consciousness, states of mind, memories, emotions, 
passions, sensations, bodily experiences, feelings, etc. (Heelas, 2005) And since 
the products of our consciousness and our mind become more important, their 
digital equivalents become important, too.
Our mind and consciousness, our sense of being, derive from our emotional de-
velopment. At its core, human consciousness is the consciousness of feeling. It is 
experiencing the self, the “very thought of” oneself (Damasio, 2000). The devel-
opment of consciousness relies on human feelings and emotions. Emotions occur 
when a person unconsciously reacts to stimuli, which then creates changes in the 
human organism. When the organism becomes aware of these changes, a feeling 
arises. But emotions can also occur when a person reacts to computer generated 
stimuli, they can be real to a person even if they were triggered by virtual situa-
tions and interactions. While our avatars or online identities may be virtual, their 
sensations are not. Experience in the virtual space is not less real than experience 
in the physical space. These behaviours, experience and attitudes create our digi-
tal identity in virtual worlds, but they also affect our physical identities in return.
With the rise of digital technology and social media, our bodies slowly become 
obsolete, our digital identities become more distinguished and notable and our 
minds become our most prominent feature. The greatest part of our digital iden-
tities is built upon the information and data we put online. Through process of 
daily calibration, our online identities and avatars become more alive, more origi-
nal, more us. And we start living our lives as our digitized version more often. Our 
bodies are no longer needed and what is left is our mind which slowly transcends 
the physicality and turns into virtual transmental2 entity.
3.2.1 Leaving the body
With new ways of expanding man’s mental and physical abilities with technol-
ogy, nanotechnology, biotechnology, cybernetics, neuroscience and pharmaceu-
tical, the new paradigm of the corporeal and mental has emerged. Bodies have 
become the “final frontiers” of post-evolution. We now live in times in which the 
 2 The concept of transmental is based on the idea of transcending the mind which resides in the 
physical body and thus becomes a mind that resides inside transhuman and posthuman forms 
of existence – virtual or cyber entities that, for now, come in the form of online identities, social 
media profiles and avatars. This mind is often determined as purely informational organism.
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technological transformation of human body and mind and the improvement 
of body and its mental abilities are no longer merely the subject of sci-fi movies 
and literature. In this regard, the greatest motivation of all may be the fear of 
death.3 After all, when we finish colonizing the nature and society, what is left 
for the bio-techno-scientific system to “colonize” and improve but the human 
(Nikodem, 2004).
What happens to the body? The human body becomes a body of data scattered 
throughout countless “digital mirrors”. This new enhanced databody becomes 
the future space of media (Kroker & Kroker, 2004), a collection of machine-read-
able digital information that validates our existence. As technology attempts to 
enhance, perfect and “save” our bodies, they will slowly stop being works of 
nature and become symbols of techno-culture and postmodernism.4 Every step 
of man’s improvement in a technological sense leads to the man’s decrement in a 
human sense because every prosthetic modification that man undergoes signifies 
the distance between him and his core, his essence; whatever the essence for him 
is – his body, mind or consciousness.
The lack of the body (Hayles, 1999) and it being slowly replaced by disembodied 
data/information/knowledge is crucial to the posthuman existence which gives 
birth to the further development of the concept of cyborgs and other forms of 
being (e.g. avatars) which have not only different “bodies”, but different men-
talities. Informational pathways connecting organic body to its prosthetic or 
virtual extension, change the nature of one’s mind for it is no longer instanti-
ated in material medium, but in material-information amalgam which constantly 
(re)constructs the body and the mind and can thus (re)construct one’s identity. 
In cybernetic and virtual reality entity’s mindset changes as much as his mecha-
nism.
How, I asked myself, was it possible for someone of Moravec’s obvious intel-
ligence to believe that mind could be separated from body? Even assuming 
such a separation was possible, how could anyone think that consciousness 
in an entirely different medium would remain unchanged, as if it had no con-
nection with embodiment? (Hayles, 1999, p. 1)
 3 It is fair to mention that this fear of death, in the context of creating new enhanced forms of life or 
artificial life, always comes in tandem with the fear that these new forms of life will turn against 
humanity and become its biggest threat.
 4 Anne Balsamo (Balsamo, 1995) argues that the “natural” body has been refashioned since the 
1980s, when the idea of the merging of the biological with the technological became prevalent in 
Western thought. Balsamo distinguishes between four different versions of postmodern embodi-
ment: the labouring body (mother as a womb), the marked body (plastic surgery), the repressed 
body (virtual reality) and the disappearing body (bioengineering, bodies and databases).
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All these transformations lead to self-defining, which then enables the self-real-
ization. Thus, the self-transformation5 of the body becomes the greatest tool to 
use in achieving oneself in the postmodern society. But our data bodies aren’t 
the only sets of identifying informational bits (Matrix, 2006, p. 30) – our minds 
slowly become sets of information virtually networked by multiplying databases 
and online identities.
3.2.2 New virtual identities
Technology is not simply changing our bodies, enabling them to expand through 
space and time and, eventually, disappear. It also changes and alters our identi-
ties, especially under the circumstances of constant technological change and its 
influence on the human brain. If we take this to be true, as well as the fact that 
our sense of self arises from our need to map the relationships between the self 
and others, then how can emotions and relationships “produced” in a virtual 
environment be of no value to our self, our consciousness? As one builds his 
identity in social and biological terms of physical world, one also constructs his 
identity in technological terms of the virtual world. What happens to identity 
in a virtual world? How can people have multiple roles or be of opposite sex 
in a virtual game? This new world enforces the creation and projection of con-
structed personae – the body is represented by avatars, which ensures relative 
anonymity, and anonymity can help people express sometimes unexplored or 
even multiple aspects of the self, something Turkle (1999) calls “cycling through 
identities”. Here, the question of what are the multiple aspects of the self must 
be asked. The identity of multiplicity first appeared in the 1960s and 1970s as a 
thesis stating that there is no such thing as an autonomous ego and that we are all 
multiplicities of parts, thus challenging the idea of a unitary self and supporting 
the notion of the fluid ego, which transitions between various aspects of the self. 
Someone could argue that people with personality disorders also change “roles” 
and live through different self states. However, the difference between disorders 
and healthy online and virtual experiences of our parallel lives is that the healthy 
individual knows how to be many things but also knows how to smooth out the 
moments of transition. 
Health is when you’re multiple but feel a unity. Health is when different 
aspects of the self can get to know each other and reflect upon each other. 
… Health is being one while being many (Bromberg, 1993, p. 166). 
 5 Self-transformation introduced the whole new question of morphological freedom, which ena-
bles a subject to become an object of its own change (Sandberg, 2001).
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Many in the field of social psychology identify individual and social identity not 
as stable characteristics of individuals but as dynamic phenomena. There is a 
constant estimation and assessment of each other during the virtual presentation 
of our powers and abilities (Capurro et al., 2013, p. 23). This opens the door to the 
concept of positioning (Harrè & Van Lagenhove, 1991; Hermans, 1996), in which 
a person, based on his or her perception of a certain social situation, decides 
what features of his or her identity are more relevant and more effective under 
the given circumstances. Identities are negotiated through the interaction with 
the virtual environment and other virtual identities. In the physical world, the 
embodied person is positioned in a particular time and space (Hermans, Kempen 
& Van Loon, 1992). What a virtual world and cyberbodies (avatars) offer is a very 
easy way of transitioning, “flying over” space, time and objects and thus having a 
chance to shape one’s self-representation differently and position oneself accord-
ingly (Talamo & Ligorio, 2001). These identities may feel displaced, distracted, 
fragmented, but in connected and networked virtual environments they become 
open to diversity and contingency that invite us to comprehend our identities in 
newly responsible, less ordained, less focused, more intricate and more open-
minded ways (Borgman, 2013, p. 15). We are no longer destined to certain identi-
ties for choices come from all sides of cyberspace.
Haraway also embraces this distance between the multiple self states, compar-
ing it to the knowing self – “[The] knowing self is partial in all its guises, never 
finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed and stitched 
together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together with-
out claiming to be another” (Haraway, 1991, p. 193). Haraway does not describe 
the death of subjectivity but its splitting and multiplicity as a possible way of 
obtaining better lines of sight and better worlds (Schneider, 2005). These expand-
ing human subjects build various social relationships, which may now include 
nonhumans and machines as partners.
Here, perhaps, lies the reason why virtual worlds are so popular. Our everyday 
lives demand that we behave and act as unitary actors (we lead more-or-less de-
termined lives), but this discrepancy between life/experience (the unitary self is 
the most basic reality) and the theory of the essentially decentred self (the unitary 
self is illusory) can become difficult for us to understand. Virtual worlds offer a 
place in which to express these multiple aspects as a healthy, diverse person. 
Different avatars and roles can explore different aspects of the self. People can 
use their virtual identities to grasp their own personal identities which are much 
broader than what is represented through a partial narrative of the self communi-
cated in digitally constructed realities (Capurro et al., 2013). Virtual worlds have 
certainly provoked the questions of the multiplicity, complexity, fluctuation and 
inconclusiveness of our identities, as well as questions regarding the meanings 
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of our virtual lives. Fluid space and time of virtuality have determined the fluidity 
of identity and our mental states.
But how do slowly “disappearing” body and virtual fluid identities fit in the World 
of mental states and social conscience?
3.2.3 From mental to transmental
The connection between body and mind, i.e. brain and mind is well known. Mind 
is the personalization of the brain. No two brains are the same, and our brains 
are different now than they were few seconds or minutes or hours ago. Brains 
have a great ability, called neuroplasticity, to change their neural pathways and 
synapses due to changes in behaviour, environment and neural processes. Thus, 
if the environment is changing, then the brain and the mind are changing as 
well. What actually happens to the brain and mind is a question asked by a num-
ber of studies (Bavelier, Green & Dye, 2010; Yuan et al., 2011) in neuroscience, 
neurophysiology and psychology. What we know today is that the human mind 
has four major characteristics: 1) the ability to combine and recombine infor-
mation and knowledge in order to develop new understandings, 2) the ability 
to apply the same solution to various problems and situations, 3) the ability to 
create and understand symbolic representations and 4) the ability to separate 
modes of thought from the input we perceive through our senses (Hauser, 2000). 
Our modes of thought and our environment, full of sensory stimuli, are inter-
linked. Thus, when our brains and minds interact with technology and digital 
information and become immersed in new virtual and networked environments, 
our modes of thought change. They transcend the cognitive “boundaries” of the 
physical world and become both symbolic representations of the new worlds as 
well as abstract devices that construct them. This new mind broadens and grows 
from the mental self into the new transmental self. Our new transhuman virtual 
“bodies” represented in the form of cyber entities, online identities and avatar, 
are now endowed with a transmental state of being – mental state that is no 
longer primarily connected to our bodies and their biological processes but to 
stimuli and information in virtual environment. 
A solely metaphysical distinction between the bodily and the digital identity 
dissolves the richer view of existential identity. Online existence involves a 
bodily abstraction which implies abstraction from bodily identity and indi-
viduality. Online existence also entails abstraction from our situational ori-
entation, an orientation which includes sharing time and space with others. 
And online existence is presence – a well as globally-oriented (Kokswijk, 2007, 
p. 92).
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On the other hand, the connection between our identity and mind is best ex-
plained through John Locke’s theory of identity (1689). Locke’s view on personal 
identity (the self) is based on the idea of psychological continuity, i.e. the self 
is founded on consciousness, memory and mind, not on body or soul. He was 
convinced that consciousness (mind) can be transferred from one soul to another 
which is essential for the theory of mind-uploading and transhumanist approach 
to immortality. Another interesting view on identity is that proposed by Capurro 
and Pingel who differentiate two kinds of identity: 1) identity as a metaphysical 
concept which remains steadily in its appearance and is granted by substance, 
and 2) identity as an ontological concept which can relate to different existen-
tial possibilities without levelling them out (Kokswijk, 2007, p. 92). This second 
identity becomes important in the context of virtual and cyber realities where the 
mentality of the creator and the mentality of its avatar may be different. Identity 
of one’s avatar may just be the extension of one’s own bodily (physical) mentality, 
but it may also be different – it stays a part of bodily identity, but it doesn’t have 
to be identical, only partially related to the bodily existence (Capurro & Pingel, 
2002).
To truly explain the rise of transmental as informational organism that stores 
our memories, emotions, thoughts, feelings and opinions and thus represents 
us, few issues need to be addressed: informational turn, information idealism, 
functionalism and mind-uploading. Together they build the foundation for the 
coming of transmental entities.
Informational turn (Floridi, 2011) is the fourth step in the process of reassessment 
of fundamental human nature which introduces the idea that humans are just 
another type of inforg, informational organism that can interact with biological 
agents as well as engineered artefacts. Since technology has made it possible 
to record and store almost every piece of information futurist predict that soon 
we could use this information to form a complete picture of an individual. The 
information frontier (Mowshowitz, 2013) is no longer present – the Internet has 
become an all-knowing system of recorded information and social conscience 
and memory6.
 6 One of the projects that is based on the notion reproducing mind through gathered informa-
tion and data is explained in Ray Kurzweil’s and Martine Rothblatt’s book “Virtually Human”. 
The book tells a story of building cyber consciousness or mindclones by simulating the human 
brain and mind. All we need to do is to build Mindfile, a digital database of our mind (thoughts, 
memories, emotions, etc.) – Mindfile, and create Mindware, a software that will mimic the way 
biological brain organizes information, creates emotions and achieves self-awarenes.
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Information idealism is quite a similar idea. Virtual reality is built by information, 
not by matter or energy and humans are agents for preservation and transmission 
of information (Hayles, 1996, p. 112). Everything is determined by information. 
As much as it sounds as pure metaphysical statement, in the context of digital 
environments and synthetic life forms we can’t but ask ourselves if we are really 
just walking and breathing algorithms or lines of code? (Hauskeller, 2012)
In the philosophy of mind functionalism stands as basic idea that mind is based 
on the functional relations between certain elements and not on those elements, 
their architecture or material structure. As Minsky (1986, p. 287) would say “Minds 
are what brains do.” This means that the mind can be recreated in any substrate 
as long as functional relations are kept. The mind is determined by a functional 
role and it doesn’t matter who or what performs the function, it can be a form of 
the virtual existence (e.g. avatar run by bots) or some form of the artificial intel-
ligence. And since information processing functions of the biological brain are 
the essential feature of every human being, replicating these functions in some 
non-corporeal lifeform becomes the fundamental idea of the existence of cyber 
entities and other transhuman and posthuman lifeforms. Some even suggest the 
idea of merging various identities into one collective consciousness (Sims, 2009) 
or collective intelligence (Nguyen & Katarzyniak, 2008).
Informational turn, information idealism and functionalism are prerequisites 
for the theory and practice of mind-uploading and its ultimate goal of creating 
transmental lifeforms. Mind-uploading is a process that involves activities like 
scanning brains and recording information with the purpose of transferring the 
gathered information into other lifeforms, organic or synthetic or bitized. Though 
many claim that a human being cannot be reduced to information or algorithm 
and that our minds are more than mere content7 the idea of uploading our minds 
into some virtual environments or artificial intelligence becomes more and more 
popular. Modern mind-uploading theories describe the process as transferring 
not only information such as memories and thoughts, but also consciousness. 
The reasons to do that may be various, from achieving enhanced cognition (Agar, 
2012) and finding a substrate that will best facilitate entity’s need to finding a 
more durable substrate and freedom that knows no physical constraints or time 
limits (Hauskeller, 2012). Mind-uploading is still not possible, but many pro-
jects8 and advances in neuroscience, cybernetics and computer technology could 
change that in the near future. Until then, three overlapping revolutions (Hefner, 
2009) – genetics (G), nanotechnology (N) and robotics (R) – stay crucial for the 
 7 Minds are conscious, aware and self-aware entitites.
 8 The Neurokernel Project, Brains in Silico (Stanford University), Human Brain Project, Brain 
Activity Map (BAM) Project and others.
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manifestation of transhumanistic and posthumanistic ideas and utopian future. 
And until some posthuman species emerge enhanced beyond human frailty and 
finitude, we need to find way how to enhance human mental and physical abili-
ties and remove undesirable characteristics. As the second basic belief of Lower 
Case transhumanism (LCTH) states: 
“we need to accept as our destiny the human nature – the body and psyche – 
with which we grew in our mother’s womb and which we brought with us as 
we emerged from that womb. Our body-psyche-nature is eminently capable of 
being edited, re-vised, and improved.” (Hefner, 2009, p. 160)
One way of editing and improving is certainly mind-uploading and creation of 
transmental states of being. 
Today, we are not merely trying to enhance our own mental powers and processes 
but we’re trying to build synthetic systems that will act as a human brain, as con-
sciousness – what we are doing is building a simulacrum in the form of artificial 
intelligence.
3.3 ICT’s impact on World 3 of Popper’s Triad
In addition to creating transmental states of existence, ICT also influences the 
rapid development of creating smarter data, information and knowledge in the 
area of artificial intelligence (AI). As John McCarthy says:
AI is the science and engineering of making intelligent machines, especially 
intelligent computer programs. It is related to the similar task of using com-
puters to understand human intelligence, but AI does not have to confine 
itself to methods that are biologically observable. Intelligence is the compu-
tational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world. Varying kinds and 
degrees of intelligence occur in people, many animals and some machines 
(McCarthy, 2007).
The history of artificial intelligence began in the second half of the 20th century. 
Very soon, the field was divided into the “strong” and the “weak” AI, thus defin-
ing two general approaches to the AI concept. Advocates of the Strong AI believe 
that machines will one day be able to reach the level of human intelligence in 
both manner and in thinking, feeling and everything else. On the other hand, 
proponents of the Weak AI hypothesis believe that this will be possible only in 
terms of behaviour. Examples of the Weak AI include intelligent activities such 
as playing chess, speech recognition, robot-motion dolls, etc. Unlike advocates of 
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the Weak AI, advocates of the Strong AI place their hopes in developing machines 
that will be able to do things currently associated with the human brain, mind 
and cognition and may even exceed humans one day.
The test for the Strong AI hypothesis was designed by Alan Turing (Turing, 1950), 
after whom it was named.9 A demonstration of the Weak AI hypothesis is pre-
sented by John R. Searle (Searle, 1980), a sceptic in terms of the scope of strong. 
He developed the Chinese room thought experiment more than thirty years ago.10 
The Strong AI advocates believe in the possibility of producing machines with 
an intelligence that matches or exceeds that of human beings, with minds that 
understand in the same sense people do. What is happening in the field of the 
Strong AI is nothing but an effort to equalize the inorganic matter (computers and 
information) with the organic matter (brain and mind) using digital technology, 
which will become the bridge between the organic and inorganic worlds. 
Among the many AI applications developed in the past sixty years, for purposes 
of this paper, it is worth pointing out to two types: expert systems, or “thinking 
machines”, and neural networks, or “learning machines”. A notable example of 
a typical “thinking machine” is a system developed within the framework of the 
Cyc project. Cyc is an ambitious project with the main aim of developing an onto-
logical/knowledge base of common-sense knowledge, with a powerful reasoning 
engine running in the background (OpenCyc, 2014). Many neural network pro-
jects and initiatives of building brain-like machines were based on designing and 
building cortex-like memory systems and imitating human intelligence. The idea 
of a learning machine is also based on the idea of connectionism. The concept 
of the parallel processing of information that is distributed across small units or 
a linked network of simple components is at the core of connectionism. Recent 
AI research attempts to model the behaviour of central nervous system hoping 
 9 The phrase “The Turing Test” is most properly used to refer to a proposal made by A. Turing 
(Turing, 1950) as a way of dealing with the question of whether machines can think. In short, the 
Turing test is designed as a question-and-answer discussion between a human, the examiner, 
who asks the questions, and a hidden human and a machine, which both give him their answers. 
When the examiner can no longer distinguish the machine’s answers from the human’s, then 
the machine passes the Turing test. We may believe that it is intelligent in the same manner as 
a human. That is why we consider the Turing test to be a test of the Strong AI hypothesis.
 10 The Chinese room argument holds that a computer cannot have a “mind”, “understanding” or 
“consciousness”, regardless of how intelligently it may make it behave (Searle, 1980). J. Searle 
imagined that we are non-Chinese citizens and we are “locked in a room” with a slot in one 
wall. We have a special book written in a language we understand and which dictates ways of 
managing the Chinese characters that are coming into the room through the slot in the wall. 
We can use the characters only by following instructions from the book. We do not understand 
the Chinese characters at all. All we can do is what book tells us. In Searle’s view, this is how a 
computer works. It is clear why we consider the Chinese room argument as evidence for the Weak 
AI hypothesis.
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to reproduce some of the complex features of the mind (Terranova, 2004, p. 101). 
Apart from the area of artificial intelligence, connectionism is most associated 
with areas of cognitive psychology, cognitive science in general and even neuro-
science, brain theory and philosophy of mind. In recent times, the most famous 
applications of connectionism have been the models of neural networks. Percep-
tron was one of the first attempts to create a “thinking machine” (Rojas, 1996, p. 
55). It is nothing but a learning algorithm, and neural networks are nothing but 
applications that will be able to perform a machine learning process through the 
so-called artificial neurons, the constitutive units of artificial neural networks.
The premise of most of these projects is quite simple – the brain is quite a me-
chanical piece of hardware and the mind is quite an exceptional piece of soft-
ware. And we could understand them better by building them and replicating 
them in other artificial inorganic organisms. But it turned out that the hardware 
is easier to engineer and replicate than the software, i.e. the mind is still too big 
an enigma. It is easier to ground AI in big data, information and accumulated 
knowledge than in thoughts, ideas, creativity and mind’s conscious and sub-
conscious layers. Complex human emotions and communication processes were 
thus reduced to imitation, simulation, functionality and automatization and the 
question remains if artificial intelligence will ever reach human intelligence.
Instead of worrying about whether machines will attain human levels of intel-
ligence by 2040, 2050 or later, we should ask the question “What is intelligence?” 
The problem with the Turing test is that it is not a test of universal intelligence; it 
is based on human intelligence, and so using this test, if machines want to prove 
us that they are intelligent, they have to prove they think as the humans. This 
paper asks the question why human intelligence should be the measure of intel-
ligence in general. We should allow machines to think in their own way. Building 
AI on the basis of human intelligence is actually just a matter of following a pat-
tern – the technology always tends to imitate the previous technology, as we have 
already mentioned: printed books first imitated manuscripts, e-books imitate 
printed books, humanoid robots imitate humans and the technology of artificial 
intelligence imitates “the technology” of human intelligence. However, some-
times, the patterns of the familiar and old must be abandoned. Maybe the answer 
lies in the “debiologization of intelligence” (Esfendiary, 1981) by defining it as a 
set of digital information, data and knowledge which can be re-materialized in 
the form of expert systems, smart technologies, assistive technologies and robots. 
McCarthy (2007) also thinks there is a problem with the fact that we still “don’t 
have a solid definition of intelligence that doesn’t depend on relating it to human 
intelligence because we cannot characterize in general what kinds of computa-
tional procedures we want to call intelligent”. Even if the time of complete AI 
dominance comes and humans are completely replaced by an inorganic digital 
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consciousness, it will think in its own digital way, and as long as it is capable of 
balancing between the other two worlds and sustaining its existence, we can say 
it passes the Turing test and that it is truly intelligent.
So why is AI important for the Popper’s World 3? Through his philosophy of infor-
mation Floridi reinvented the term “infosphere” as a global system that includes 
any belief, data, idea, information, knowledge or any other mental creation 
encoded in both computerised physical environment and digitally constructed 
synthetic worlds (Van der Veer Martens, 2015, p. 324). This infosphere is filled 
with inforgs, information-processing organisms and mechanism, including the 
most advanced supercomputers. Though Floridi mainly focused on humans as 
self-conscious and self-determining inforgs, lately we witness the rise of non-
humans like different bots, smart agents and robots that stand equal with the 
rest of inforgs, including humans, and slowly start to participate in creating the 
products of synthetic mind. As AI becomes more prone to planning, learning, 
perception and developing other aspects of its intelligence, and as we witness 
the rise of robots who can compose songs, write stories, detect and recognize 
patterns, etc., we can freely say that we no longer have only machine-readable 
data/information/knowledge, but machine-made. It is obvious that AI constantly 
tries to reproduce the outcome of human intelligent behaviour by non-biological 
means and to produce the non-biological equivalent of human intelligence, i.e. 
information, data and knowledge (Floridi, 2011, p. 227). They do this using their 
own intelligence and logic – mathematical codes, speech recognition, natural 
language processing, machine learning and interaction with their environment, 
as well as humans. Thus, the products of thought can be processed, presented, 
today even produced11, by robots and large scale systems (LSS). As Kile (2013) 
suggests, today’s society and social systems are slowly falling behind the capa-
bilities of smart technologies, AI and large scale systems that are evolving much 
faster than social systems can adapt. In the Popper’s World 3 this may seem as 
a machine-enabled and a machine-driven simplification of our daily lives and a 
complexity of humanness and as our ever increasing dependence to technology 
and the system. But in the World 3 of the Technological Triad the “nature” of ar-
tificial intelligence and capabilities of thinking and learning machines may just 
be the most effective, most economic, most robust way to answer the challenges 
of information and the postmodern society.
 11 For instance, many algorithms today can produce original compositions.
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4 Conclusion
Technology increasingly dominates both nature and human beings. Initially, we 
had a large amount of techno-optimism: every new technology was met with 
sheer delight. Every problem would be solved – from transportation, education 
and social equality to famine, sickness and death. But then, as dehumanizing 
aspects of the computerization became evident, slowly came “pessimism” and 
disappointment that the technology is not going to solve all our problems as pre-
dicted, at least not as soon as Hans Moravec thought (Moravec, 1998).12 What we 
need is optimistic technological realism and a healthy approach to technology, 
which views it as something that will assist us on our way to the future but not 
replace us, as something that will enhance and upgrade our world and ourselves. 
We must be aware of sometimes distorted or oversimplified ideas about the future 
of technology and its impact on the society. However, we must also be aware that 
we already have the technology that helps us transcend our natural bodily and 
mental limits and change or broaden our reality. This does not mean that the 
technology erases all that was before it. Rather, it builds upon the past and stands 
beside it. In the same way, our new technological triad is not here to replace the 
Popper’s or any other triad. It is here to exist along with them, to broaden them 
and to augment them. 
Modern times offer new integral elements in the conceptual triad – the world 
of physical objects and events, including biological entities, is being replaced 
by the world of virtual reality (i.e. the Virtual World) with virtual entities and 
identities such as avatars and social media profiles; the world of mental objects 
and events is being replaced by the transmental in the form of the transhuman or 
posthuman informational organism (i.e. the Transmental World) and the world of 
objective knowledge is being replaced by the world of digitized data/information/
knowledge in the form of super-machines and AI (i.e. the Digital World). The three 
worlds are connected: on the one side transmental entities abide and act in vir-
tual environments and cyberspace where they continue to form and grow, and on 
the other side, in the context of transhumanist theory, these entities are nothing 
but a set of gathered information, data and knowledge (information, memories, 
emotions, attitudes, etc.) accessible to and readable by machines.
 12 In his paper “When will computer hardware match the human brain?”, outlining Moore’s law, 
Moravec describes how “the performance of AI machines tends to improve at the same pace that 
AI researchers get access to faster hardware” (Moravec, 1998).
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Virtual World Transmental World
Digital World
Figure 2: New Technological Triad
As technological changes arrive (with many of them already being here), we can 
only ask what will become of the physical, intellectual and mental/human in this 
process of integration with technology. Will they stand aside, find a new place 
within the changes or disappear, thus opening space for new realities and new 
forms of mentality and cognition? What we do see is that slowly, the world of 
physical things is taken over by technology, while the world of ideas and knowl-
edge is being replaced by the world of digital data/information/knowledge. What 
will happen to the world of mental states is more difficult to predict. We cannot 
help but think that because the world of mental states uses the technology to 
transcend the current mental states thus creating the Transmental World, it will 
maybe succumb to the process of formalization by slowly adjusting itself to the 
world of data and technological processes; maybe it will slowly cease to exist in 
its present endless form endowed with the power of contemplation, imagination 
and reasoning and merge with the world of digital data/information/knowledge 
in some special but unimaginable post-transhumanistic vision where everything 
is bounded by the digital information itself and thus subjected to instrumentali-
zation. Or as Leckie and Buschman (2008, p. 38) would say “Technological sys-
tems impose technical management on human beings” and illusion becomes the 
basic structure of human experience. Whether we see our technological future 
as a promised one or as an escape from the human condition and all that stands 
for human, it is certain that we are faced with the new ideal of humanity – the 
information quality which defines not only our culture, society, relations and 
distribution of knowledge and power, it defines us, our identity and our mentality 
making everything so definable, measurable, controllable and representable. In 
the context of the Popper’s worlds these attributes might be seen as unwelcome, 
but in the context of the new technological triad they become essential for creat-
ing and sustaining the new parallel reality.
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